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We examine the determinants of a current migrant's location choice emphasizing the relative 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A characteristic of international migration is the clustering of immigrants in ethnic communities. 
Prominent examples are the concentration of Turks in Germany, Tamils in Switzerland, 
Moroccans in the Netherlands and Belgium, Italians in Argentina, Greeks in Australia, and 
Ukrainians in Canada. Clustering may be very narrow, such as when immigrants from a town or 
region are concentrated in a specific foreign town or region. For example, Macedonians from 
Skopje have come to make up a notable part of the population of Gothenburg, Sweden. In the 
United States, noticeable clusters of Mexican immigrants exist in California, Texas, Florida and 
Chicago. Fifty-eight percent of migrants from Guanajuato, the Mexican state with the highest 
emigration rate to the US, go to California and another 23 percent to Texas. 
The prevailing explanation for immigrant clusters is the existence of beneficial network 
externalities when previous immigrants provide shelter and work, assistance in obtaining credit, 
and/or generally reduce the stress of relocating to a foreign culture (see Gottlieb, 1987; 
Grossman, 1989; Marks, 1989; Church and King, 1993; Carrington, Detragiache, and 
Vishwanath, 1996; Chiswick and Miller, 1996; Zahniser, 1999; Munshi, 2003). Ethnic networks, 
however, might also be associated with negative externalities. Disadvantageous network 
externalities may arise if immigration is subject to adverse selection, or if increases in immigrant 
concentration increases competition for jobs and lower immigrants’ wages.  Under certain 
conditions the tendency to cluster may lower incentives to learn the language of the host country, 
which in turn may “trap” migrants in poverty (Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2005). These negative 
network externalities limit the benefits immigrants can obtain from clustering.  
Several studies investigate the determinants of location choice by immigrants in the 
United States. Bartel (1989) finds that post-1964 migrants to the US tend to locate in cities with a 
high concentration of immigrants of similar ethnicity. She further shows that highly skilled 
migrants are less geographically concentrated and rely less on the location of fellow compatriots. 
Similarly, Jaeger (2000), who differentiates between immigrants of different admission statuses, 
finds that immigrants tend to locate where former immigrants of the same ethnicity are 
concentrated. 
Migrants consider several factors in making their decisions about where to move, 
including the clustering of compatriots and similar folk in various localities. Ties of kinship, 
   1friendship, and village, link migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the home and host 
country. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the differing effects of “stock” 
and “flow” factors on migrants' location decisions. Stock factors measure the degree to which 
migrants may view a US location as (ethnically) hospitable and the availability of information 
about specific locations. We characterize two types of stock factors, an ethnic goods component 
and a village migration history component. Our flow factor measures the tendency of migrants to 
follow the paths of very recent migrants from their own villages.  
These factors offer different information to a potential migrant. The ethnic goods 
component sends signals to the migrant about the possibility of living in a culturally similar 
environment, i.e., speaking his native language, listening to his music, reading his own 
newspapers, and eating ethnic food. The ethnic goods factor reduces the monetary and psychic 
costs of migrating. The village migration history component largely captures information about 
the host region received in the home village. This includes, for example, information on the labor 
and housing market, and information on specific employers in a region. In addition, the migrant 
may be able to count on contacts in a specific location established by former migrants from the 
same village. This factor reflects the probability of receiving help from compatriots. The flow 
factor represents potential herd behavior by migrants, a sort of “peer emulation effect.” 
Following the argument by Epstein (2002), migrants may choose a location on the supposition 
that recent migrants had information that he does not have. We examine the relative importance 
of migrant stocks and flows as explanations of immigrant location choice, also accounting for 
several other determinants.  
Until the appearance of the paper by Polachek and Horvath (1977) much of migration 
theory treated migration as an individual investment decision. Family members other than the 
household head are not always explicitly considered. However, other members are clearly 
influential in migration decisions.  Polachek and Horvath (1977) established the foundations 
for models of location choice that take into consideration all the different type of considerations. 
They do so by adopting a life cycle approach used in human capital theories of 
earnings accumulation, accounting for household considerations in both a general theoretical and 
empirical model. More importantly, migration was analyzed within a nonstochastic framework 
and remigration was endogenously explained. 
  We describe our data and define and characterize the variables we employ in Section 2. 
   2Section 3 presents our empirical results, while Section 4 offers a theoretical model explaining 
our results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS IN THE US 
In absolute numbers, the US is the world's largest country of immigration; Mexico is the 
world's major country of emigration; migration from Mexico to the United States is the largest 
sustained flow of migration in the world. Empirical evidence suggests that there exist strong 
network effects in Mexican migration (Bustamante, 1998; Munshi, 2003; Winters, de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2001). We explore the stock and flow effects of clustering on migrants’ location 
choices using individual and village level data on Mexican-US migration available through the 
Mexican Migration Project.
1 The data comprise more than 7,000 households in 52 communities 
in the states of Colima, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San Luis Potosí, and 
Zacatecas. The data set provides information on the socioeconomic characteristics of household 
heads, such as age, education and marital status, their migration histories including information 
on year of migration, costs of border crossing, documentation and location in the United States. 
In calculating our flow variable and one of our stock variables, we use an event-history file 
containing detailed labor and family histories of each household head, such as information on the 
number of trips to the United States, the duration of each trip, and related information, for each 
year from the birth of the household head until the year of the survey. 
We calculate for each year t (t=1,…,T) the cumulative migration experience (in months) 
for each migrant I (i=1,…,N) from the Mexican community m (m=1,…,M) in each US location j 
(j=1,…,J).
2 The cumulative migration experience of community m in US location j,  , is  mjt EXP
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= ∑∑          (1) 
where  Mmjit  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an individual i in the Mexican 
community m is in US location j at year t. 
                                                 
1 See the Appendix A for a description of the data and its reliability. 
2 We do not discount months over time, or for those who have returned to their village in 
Mexico. Although their knowledge of current labor market conditions may deteriorate, they 
provide key links and support for the network. The differential impact of more recent migrants is 
   3  We define the Village Migration Experience,  ,  as the cumulative migration 
experience for each migrant i from the Mexican community m in each US location j, relative to 
the total experience of that village in the US. The measure captures the Mexican village’s 















VME Experience Migration Village .               (2) 
In addition to the migration experience of a particular Mexican village, we use the 
Mexican Share of the Total Population in a US location (see the Appendix for a description of 
the calculation of this variable). This second stock variable disregards specific village 
information, instead capturing the concentration of ethnic goods in a location relative to other 
locations. Adding this second stock variable helps distinguish a generalized stock effect from 
village-specific links.
3 
We also examine the impact of the flow of migrants during the year before an individual 
migrates, calculated as the Change in Village Migration Experience, FLOWmjt, in the year before 
an individual migrates, 
 
      ,   (3)  ) 1 ( − − = t mj mjt mjt VME VME FLOW
 
where   We visualize that the person makes his/her decision at the end of 
period t. This enables us to see how the relative flow of migrants between t-1 and t affects the 
probability of migrating to a particular location at time t. Since we are interested in the flow to a 
certain destination relative to other locations, we present define the flow variable in relative 
terms.  
. 0 ) 1 ( ≥ ≥ − t mj mjt VME VME
  In an uncertain environment, networks provide information about the host locations. 
Although knowledge of current labor market conditions may deteriorate over time, migrants who 
have returned several years ago may still provide key links and support for new migrants, such as 
                                                                                                                                                             
captured by our flow measure, while our Mexican share of the total population variable captures 
the generalized impact of having other Mexicans around in a US location. 
   4arranging a coyote to smuggle them across the border, provide information about alternative 
locations, or simply telling stories about their experiences and passing on knowledge. More 
recent migrants with current first hand information about job opportunities are likely to help their 
community members find jobs. Others from the broader ethnic group set the tone and 
atmosphere of living in locations away from home.  
  Our village migration experience variable and our flow variable are scaled by the 
village’s experience in the United States, making them relative measures reflecting the influence 
of the village network on location choice.  The spread of migrants across the US has an 
important impact on the utility a migrant obtains from the network; there are both positive and 
negative network effects. As the concentration of migrants’ increase, their wages decrease; 
however, as geographic mobility is high and US labor markets are highly integrated, wages and 
network effects are relative. A similar argument can be put forward when considering the 
attitude of the local population towards immigrants.  
To control for other factors that may affect the utility levels associated with a US 
location, we include several variables capturing the economic and social characteristics of a 
location in the multivariate analysis. These factors include, for each US location, population size, 
the consumer price index to capture cost of living differences, and the unemployment rate in 
those locations. Though the unemployment rate is sometimes problematic in migration studies, 
the literature often assumes that the probability of choosing a particular location decreases with 
the unemployment rate in this location (see the discussion in Jaeger (2000)).
4 A detailed 
description of the variables used in the empirical analysis is given in Appendix A. 
Migration costs affect location choice. Most Mexican migrants have a very low income in 
their home village. Therefore, the cost of migrating may be an important factor in determining 
the specific location to which to migrate. To control for these costs we include road mileage 
from the migrant’s origin village in Mexico to the alternative US locations.
5 We also examine 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 We thank Julie Phillips for making this variable available to us.  
expressed by the migrant himself. All three cost variable yield similar results in our estimations. 
4 Our empirical analysis treats the network for each Mexican community as exogenous to the 
individual migration decision. We feel this is the appropriate specification. However, one could 
argue that unobserved autocorrelated fluctuations in US local labor markets may draw migrants 
together to one location even if previously migrants from that community had gone elsewhere. 
Local unemployment rates in the US receiving communities also control for this. 
5 In addition to road mileage, we also examined hours by car and the actual migration costs 
   5US location specific fixed effects in order to control for time constant determinants of the 
location
and flows to vary between the first-time an 
individ
igrants are undocumented, indicating that 
Mexica
where 24.2 percent of the residents are of Mexican origin (Appendix B). Laredo has the highest 
 choice. 
The covariates just discussed are US location specific, as dictated by our desire to 
examine determinants of migrants’ location choice, and by the conditional logit model we 
discuss in the next section. In addition we use several individual specific variables and examine 
how these individual dimensions interact with our stock and flow effect variables. We look at the 
interaction of the location specific variables with skill level, legal status and whether it is 
someone’s first trip to the US or their last trip (as recorded in the data). Migrants with six or 
fewer years of schooling are assumed to be unskilled; those with more than six years are 
considered skilled. Migrants report themselves whether they migrated legally (documented) or 
illegally (undocumented). We expect the migrant’s use of the information provided by the stock 
of previous migrants or their inclination to follow the flow will vary depending on these factors. 
In particular, we expect the impacts of stocks 
ual migrates to the US and repeat movers. 
Table 1 presents a description of the data we use in our analysis. For the first migration, 
we have information on 1739 individuals from 47 Mexican villages who migrated to 43 different 
locations in the US The geographic unit in the US varies – some are cities, some are parts of a 
county, and some are counties – but they are generally recognizable as sensible divisions (See 
Appendices B and C for a list of the locations). We assume that each person has the possibility of 
going to each of these 43 locations, but does not consider other locations.
6 This generates 74,777 
observations – each person may or may not go to each of the 43 locations. For the last migration, 
we have 1561 individuals from 47 Mexican villages going to 46 US locations, resulting in 
71,806 observations. Unskilled migrants dominate, comprising 67 percent of first time migrants 
and 74 percent of last time migrants. On the other hand, 88 percent of first time migrants are 
undocumented, while only 46 percent of repeat m
ns obtain US residence permits over time.  
Table 1 further shows that Mexicans make up about 5.5 percent of the population of the 
US locations in our sample. The highest concentration could be observed in Laredo, Texas, 
                                                 
6 Under the conditional logit formulation we apply, it is assumed the potential availability of 
other location choices will not affect the coefficient estimates. 
   6unemployment rate in our sample (more than 16 percent), a very small local population and is 
very close to Mexico. Though the city is small and has a high unemployment rate, many appear 
to migrate there, because it is close to the border. The Village Migration Experience variable 
averages 1.9 percent. It reaches a maximum of 29.2 percent in Los Angeles, followed by 
Chicago with 9.2 percent (Appendix B). The migration flow appears to be about twice as large 
for first time migrants than for repeat migrants. Each of our locations has, on average, an 
unemployment rate of 7.1 percent, a population of 1.35 million, and is approximately 1460 miles 
away from the sending village in Mexico.  
Figures 1 and 2 describe some typical patterns of our two stock variables. In Figure 1 we 
plot the Herfindahl index of the concentration of the US migration experience of nine typical 
Mexican villages for the time period covered in our sample. The index is given by 
 















                                                
      ( 4 )  
 
with 0 ≤ HERFmt ≤ 1. Higher values of HERFmt indicate a higher concentration of the migration 
experience of a Mexican village. The villages differ in the concentration of their migration 
experience. Compared to the other villages depicted in Figure 1, concentration is relatively low 
in communities 36 and 38 in the Mexican State S.L.P., community 46 in Zacatecas, and 
community 33 in Colima.
7  In most of the villages the concentration of the migration experience 
is increasing over time and flattens out at the end of the sample, indicating some kind of 
quadratic pattern, though most of the villages do not reach a turning point. Only in community 
36 do we observe the concentration of the migration experience increasing at the very beginning 
of the sample period, reaching a maximum and then decreasing. In contrast to all other 
communities we observe a U-shaped pattern in community 52 in Oaxaca. Note that we find such 
a pattern only in two communities. In terms of US locations, Los Angeles County is the location 
with the highest average value of migration experience. 
Figure 2 shows the development of our second stock variable, the share of the Mexican 
population, in six US locations for the period covered in our sample. We display the Imperial 
 
7 The data set does not provide names for the Mexican villages. 
   7Valley, Chicago, Houston, and Miami for their geographical dispersion and generic interest. In 
these five US locations the share of the Mexican population is increasing. The sixth US location 
is Laredo, Texas, which has the highest average share of Mexican population in our sample. In 
Laredo, the share of the Mexican population shows a U-shaped pattern over time; it decreases 
until 1982 and then increases. 
 
3. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Econometric Approach 
To analyze the determinants of the location choice of Mexican migrants to the US, we estimate a 
conditional logit model (McFadden, 1984).
8 Each Mexican migrant i, who is assumed to 
maximize his utility, faces a choice among J alternative US communities. Assume that the utility 
of choosing location j is given by  
 
  , X U ij j ij ε β + =  (5) 
 
where Xj is a vector of the characteristics of the US location j, including stock and flow effects, 
and  εij is an error term that is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. The 
probability that an individual i chooses location j is given by  
 
   (6)  . j k ) U U ( ik ij ≠ >     all for             Pr
 
Let Yi be a random variable that takes the values 0 and 1, indicating the location choice made by 















Pr  (7) 
where Xj is a vector of characteristics of the US communities in our sample and β is a parameter 
vector to be estimated. Equation (7) can be estimated using maximum likelihood. Note that our 
sample is restricted to individuals who actually migrated at some point in time to the US. The 
                                                 
8 Bartel (1989) and Jaeger (2000) also use this model to study the location choice of migrants in 
   8analysis does not consider migration within Mexico.  
As discussed in Section 2, our regressors include two measures of the effect of the stock 
of migrants, i.e., the Mexican share of the total population in US location j and the migration 
experience of a Mexican village m in the US location j,  VMEmjt,  a measure of the flow of 
migrants, FLOWmjt, the population size, the consumer price index (cpi), and the unemployment 
rate in US location j, as well as the cost of migration proxied by the road mileage distance 
between Mexican village m and US location j.  The existing theory (see, for example, Epstein, 
2002) shows that we should expect the stock variables, Village Migration Experience and the 
Mexican share of the population to have an inverted U-shape relationship with respect to the 
probability of migrating to a certain location. As the stock of migrants in a location increases, the 
probability of a new migrant moving to that location increases at a decreasing rate, because 
positive network effects decrease and negative network externalities increase as the number of 
immigrants increase. Eventually, a turning point is reached after which a further increase in the 
stock of migrants will decrease the probability of a new migrant moving to that location. Hence, 
our specification of equation (7) includes both a linear and a squared term for the two stock 
variables. All other variables enter linearly. 
We analyze the determinants of location choice both with and without US location fixed 
effects. Accounting for location fixed effects controls for the influence of time invariant 
heterogeneity. For example, one might argue that climate is an important determinant of location 
choice – especially in a study of the migration of persons from Mexico to US locations as 
climatically diverse as Laredo, TX, and New York City, NY.  
In our empirical analysis we consider several specifications of equation (7).  As 
individuals may have migrated more than once to the US, we divide our analysis into two parts: 
first and last migration. In the former we consider only the location decision made by the 
Mexican migrants at his/her first time migrating to the US while the latter consider only the 
location decisions made at his/her last time migrating to the US, conditional that he/she migrated 
to the US at least once before. For both specifications we estimate an overall (constrained) 
equation and an unconstrained equation. In the latter all variables considered in the basic 
specification are fully interacted with four dummy variables, one for unskilled illegal migrants, 
one for unskilled legal migrants, one for skilled illegal migrants, and one for skilled illegal 
                                                                                                                                                             
the United States. 
   9migrants.  
 
Estimation Results – without US location fixed effects 
The second and seventh columns in Table 2 (first migration) and Table 3 (last migration) present 
the results for the constrained model (i.e., where we do not account for variation due to skill or 
legal status); columns 3-6 and 8-11 present the results for the unconstrained model; columns 2-6 
do not include US location fixed effects, while columns 7-11 do. Consider the results for the 
constrained specification for the first migration decision. The Mexican share in the population of 
a US location appears to have an inverted U-shaped effect on the probability of choosing a 
particular location. Evaluated at the sample mean of a Mexican population share of 5.51 percent, 
the average marginal effect of an increase of the population share by one percent is 0.15.
9 
Simulations we performed show the predicted effect of the share of Mexicans in the population 
of an average US location on the probability of choosing that location peaks at a population share 
of about 10 percent.
10  
Our other stock variable, the migration experience of a Mexican village, also follows an 
inverted U-shaped pattern, i.e., an increase in the share of a village’s migration experience in a 
particular US location relative to its total Mexican migration experience increases the probability 
of choosing a particular US location at a decreasing rate. At a Village Migration Experience 
(VME) of approximately 63 percent the impact peaks, declining afterwards. While most cities in 
most times are on the uphill side of this turning point, we do observe four US locations where the 
value of VMEmjt exceeds 63 percent: Los Angeles County, Orange County and San Diego County 
                                                 
]
9 The marginal effects of a change in the characteristics Xj of a US location j on the probability 
that a Mexican migrant will choose location j are given by the derivative of equation (15) with 
respect to the characteristics Xj., Note that these marginal effects will vary with the 
characteristics of a US location j, which leads to a very large number of marginal effects to 
interpret. Therefore, we follow the simplifying approach chosen by Jaeger (2000) and calculate 
average effects of a change in the characteristics X on Pr(Yi=j), i.e. 
[ β ˆ )) J / 1 ( 1 )( J / 1 ( X / ) j Y Pr( j i − = ∂ = ∂ , where J=43 for the first migration decision and J=47 for 
the last migration decision. Hence, to obtain average marginal effects, the coefficients reported in 
Table 3 have to be multiplied by 0.0227 and those in Table 4 by 0.0208. 
10 In particular, we calculated 
) X ' exp( 1
) X ' exp(






= =  using sample means for Xj for all 
variables except the variable of interest and assuming that the location specific fixed effects are 
zero. 
   10in California and Chicago.
11 The coefficient on the variable capturing flow effects is significantly 
positive. The average marginal effect for this variable is calculated to be 0.0053, indicating that a 
1 percent increase in the flow of migrants to a specific US location in the last year increases the 
probability that a migrant chooses this location on average by 0.53 percent. 
For the constrained model without US location fixed effects, and for the four subgroups 
considered in the unconstrained model, the Mexican share in the population of a US location has 
an inverted U-shaped pattern. It appears that the Mexican stock in a US location is more 
important for unskilled as compared to skilled workers. Whereas the probability of choosing a 
US location peaks at a Mexican population share of approximately 10 percent for the latter, it 
reaches a maximum for skilled workers at a population share of 8 percent. Comparing legal and 
illegal migrants, however, no clear pattern emerges. 
As in the constrained model, the estimated inverted U-shaped pattern for the village 
experience variable is much flatter than the respective pattern for the Mexican population share. 
However, in contrast to the Mexican population share, important differences between legal and 
illegal migrants appear. For illegal migrants, the effect of village migration increases the average 
probability of choosing a US location up to a share of 61 percent for unskilled, and 71 percent 
for skilled. For legal migrants this variable reaches its maximum effect at a share of 48 percent 
for unskilled and a share of 53 percent for skilled migrants. 
The flow of migrants significantly affects all sub-groups considered. It further appears 
that there are no significant differences of the estimated flow effect between the different groups. 
Finally, the response of illegal migrants is more sensitive to changes in the migration flow before 
their migration decision as compared to legal migrants. However, as already noted above, these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
Overall, these results indicate that legal and skilled migrants are less dependent on the 
stock of migrants when deciding on the location. The results further suggest that village-specific 
links, captured by the migration experience of a village, are on average relatively more important 
for the location choice of a migrant than ethnic goods, captured by the Mexican population share. 
The estimation results for the last migration decision, not accounting for the possibility of 
US location fixed effects, are reported in Table 3. As for the first migration decision, both stock 
variables appear to have an inverted U-shaped pattern on the probability of choosing a US 
                                                 
11 This only happened in certain years and does not show up in the Appendix tables. 
   11location and the pattern of the effect is much flatter for the village migration experience as 
compared to the share of the Mexican population in a US location. Comparing the different 
groups differentiated in the unconstrained model does not give a significantly different picture 
than the one obtained in Table 2. Comparing the first and last migration decision, however, it 
appears that both flow and stock effects are slightly more important for the last migration 
decision: the peaks are at a higher probability level and a higher share for the two stock 
variables. The effect of the flow variable on the probability of choosing a US location is steeper 
for the last as compared to the first migration decision. 
Let us now consider what effects US location characteristics have on migrant location 
choice, still not accounting for the possibility of US location fixed effects. In the constrained 
model, the unemployment rate in a US location has a negative effect on the probability of 
choosing a location. However, only for the migrants’ first trip is this effect statistically 
significant. In the unconstrained model, the effect of the unemployment rate on the location 
decision of a migrant is unclear for his/her first trip. According to the results reported in Table 2, 
the unemployment rate has a significant negative impact on the location decision of skilled 
illegal migrants and an unexpected significant positive impact on unskilled legal migrants. For 
the last trip of a migrant, the unemployment rate in the US location j affects only the location 
choices of skilled migrants on a statistically significant level; an increase in the unemployment 
rate in a US location decreases the probability that a skilled Mexican migrates there by 0.4 
percent for illegal migrants and by 0.2 percent for legal migrants. Cost of living differences as 
captured by the consumer price index do not seem to drive location choice. Where the CPI is 
significant, it lowers the probability of moving to a location. We also examined a specification 
omitting the CPI., which left our other coefficient estimates essentially unchanged. 
The probability that migrants choose a particular US location increases with the total 
population in that location for the first trip. For the last trip the total population has a positive 
effect on the location choice of unskilled illegal and skilled migrants, and a negative effect on 
unskilled legal migrants. This result reflects preferences for moving to regions with relatively 
large labor markets. The distance between the home community and the US location has a 
negative impact on illegal migrants and a positive impact on documented migrants on their first 
trip; the estimated coefficients are, however, not statistically significant at the 5 percent-level. 
For the last migration decision the distance to the US location shows an unexpected pattern. For 
   12the constrained model and for unskilled workers in the unconstrained model the coefficient of the 
distance variable is significantly positive indicating that a higher distance increases the 
probability of choosing a US location. It might be that this variable captures some other effects 
of characteristics of the US locations we did not control for in our specification. 
 
Estimation Results – with US location fixed effects
12 
  A difficulty in our analysis is that there are probably unobserved region specific factors 
that determine migrants’ location choice. For example, there may be variations among US 
locations with respect to resource endowments, cultural influences on legal and political 
arrangements, climate, and so on. To the extent that these factors are time invariant, we can 
control for these time invariant factors by including location specific fixed effects. Our results 
when we do this are seen in Tables 3 and 4, columns 7 to 11. 
With a notable exception the inclusion of US location fixed effects does not change our 
results. Comparing the estimations for first migration in Table 3 without (columns 2 to 6) and 
with (columns 7 to 11) fixed effects, Village Migration Experience and our flow variable 
continue to be significant with approximately the same impact. The Mexican Population Share, 
however, is now not significant, small, and generally has a negative impact. Perhaps this share is 
slow to change and its effect is now absorbed by the location dummies. In Table 4 we observe 
the same phenomenon. On the bright side, the inclusion of US location fixed effects helps clear 
up some anomalies we noticed. In particular, distance is now negative and significant in its 
impact on location choice. 
Our empirical results show that both of our stock measures and the flow of immigrants 
have significant effects on the migrant’s decision about where to migrate. We should and cannot 
neglect these effects when analyzing location choice. These results confirm and extend other 
results on the importance of networks in location choice (for example, Jaeger (2000), and 
Winters, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2001)). However, the choice of network variable can make a 
difference in ones conclusions.  The Mexican share of the population becomes insignificant 
when US location fixed effects are included. Without accounting for these fixed effects, the 
Mexican share of the population is significant and portrays an inverse U shape. The village stock 
                                                 
12 We thank a referee for leading us to this analysis. 
   13externality effect is larger and more robust, and also exhibits an inverse U shape, and not the 
simple positive linear effect as often presented in the literature. 
 
4. A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION: HERD EFFECTS AND MIGRATION NETWORKS 
One possible explanation for the results presented above is the relative importance and 
interaction of herd behavior (flows) and network externalities (stocks) in determining migration 
behavior. Both motivations give rise to immigrant clustering, a phenomenon observed in a wide 
variety of migration destinations. The theory we develop below builds on the work of Epstein 
(2002). 
Let us first consider network externalities. Consider individual j’s utility from migrating 
to a certain location, Uj (.). Uj (.) is a function of two variables: (i) the wage that the migrant will 
receive by migrating to the new location; and (ii) the stock of immigrants from the same origin 
who previously migrated to the new location, N. From the above discussion, the migrant’s utility 
increases with the migrant’s wage and increases with network externalities:   

















N w U j j .  
  
  Assume a normal downward-sloping demand function for workers in the host 
location, ( ) f
d w q  and an upward-sloping supply function workers, ( ) N N q L
s , . In equilibrium 
demand equals supply:  ( ) ( ) N N q w q L
s
f
d , = . In equilibrium wages are given by  . Note 
that the equilibrium wage decreases as the stock of immigrants increases. The stock of migrants 
(the network effect) affects utility in two ways: directly via positive externalities and indirectly 
via negative externalities on the wages. The “old” migrants (the stock of immigrants) who are 
already in the host location prefer that the maximum number of migrants coming to this location 
will be such that their utility is maximized. That is, the marginal increase in the migrants’ utility 
from externalities equals the marginal effect of the decrease in wages because of the additional 
migrant.  
) (
* N w f
Denote by N1 the optimal stock of immigrants in the sense that this is the preferred stock 
of migrants who have previously migrated to this host location. Thus if the stock of immigrants 
exceeds  N1, further increasing the stock of immigrants raises non-wage network benefits, 
   14however wages also decrease. The effect of the increase in non-wage benefits is smaller than the 
effect of the decrease in wages and the utility of the immigrants who had previously migrated to 
this location decreases.  
   We may still observe migrants deciding to migrate to a location in which the stock of 
migrants has already exceeded N1. Thus, the probability that an individual chooses to migrate to a 
location where the stock of immigrants already exceeds N1 is positive.. This probability however, 
decreases as the stock of immigrants already in the host location increases. We conclude, 
 
Given network externalities, the probability an individual migrates to a certain location has an 
inverse U shape relationship with regard to the stock of immigrants already in the host location.  
 
  Now let us consider herd behavior. Following Epstein (2002) migration decisions are 
made sequentially, with people contemplating emigration at a given stage in their lives. 
Individuals respond to signals or information packets about host location possibilities. An 
individual receives a signal with probability p and with probability q this signal is true. The 
individual also observes the behavior of previous migrants. Potential migrants cannot, however, 
observe the information signal that was the basis for previous migrants’ decisions. Given the 
information available, each individual chooses a location to which to migrate. The structure of 
the game and Bayesian rationality are common knowledge. Three assumptions govern 
individuals’ actions: (a) An individual, who does not receive a signal and observes that 
everybody else has chosen to stay home, will also choose not to migrate. (b) An individual who 
is indifferent between following his or her own signal and copying someone else’s choice will 
follow his or her own signal.  (c) An individual who is indifferent between following more than 
one of the previous migrants’ decisions will choose to randomize his or her decision with equal 
probabilities assigned to the different alternatives. 
Under this framework it can be shown
13 that if an individual receives a signal to migrate 
to a specific place, he will follow this signal. If a second individual receives the same signal he 
will follow individual 1 and if he does not receive a signal he will also follow individual ,1 since 
the first migrant decided to migrate only because he had a signal and individual 2 can see it as if 
                                                 
13 See Epstein (2002) for the formal proof and generalization. 
   15he himself received this signal. Now consider the case where individuals 1 and 2 migrated to one 
location, location 1, and individual 3 receives a signal to immigrate to location 2. Since the first 
individual migrated it is clear he had a signal. Therefore, individuals  1 and 3 had different 
signals. Since individual 2 also migrated to the same location as individual 1, he may have 
received a signal to migrate to location 1 or he may not have received a signal at all. Using a 
Bayesian Rule it can be shown that the probability of immigrating to location 1 is higher than 
that of location 2 and thus individual 3 will follow the first two migrants instead of following the 
signal he received. On average there are 1+p signals for location 1 while there is only 1 signal 
for location 2. Epstein (2002) shows that  
 
As the number of individuals that have already migrated to some certain location 
increases, the probability of a new individual migrating to the same location increases. 
Individuals will migrate following the herd (flow) while disregarding their own private 
information.  
 
As we can see from the empirical results, the theory of herd verses network externality may 




Immigrant clustering is an important phenomenon to study for a number of reasons. The process 
by which immigrants decide where to locate is one that is not clearly understood, though there is 
much research on the subject. Standard economic theory argues that there are significant 
externalities, or “ethnic capital,” of which immigrants wish to take advantage. They move to 
where members of their community, generally defined, had previously gone, planning to avail 
themselves of these externalities. In this paper we emphasize the different information content in 
different types of networks by examining two stock influences and a flow influence on the 
migration location decision. 
  Although previous studies have highlighted the role of networks on migration, no one has 
studied the potentially different impacts of migration stocks vs. migration flows. The paper 
argues that the relationship between the stock of migrants and the location choice of new 
   16migrants follows an inverted U, while because of herding the relationship between migration 
flows and location choice is positive. 
  We use data from the Mexican Migration Project to investigate the location decision of 
Mexican migrants in the US We distinguish between two types of stock effects, capturing 
general ethnic goods available in a US location (Mexican share of the total population in a 
particular US location) on the one hand, and origin village connections and the history of the 
migration experience of a village in different US locations (Village Migration Experience, the 
tendency of residents of a given Mexican village to migrate to a particular US location, 
measuring information available in the sending village of a given US location) on the other hand. 
These two variables help us to distinguish a generalized stock effect from village-specific links. 
The flow effect is measured using the flow of migrants to a particular US location during the 
year prior to the migration decision of an individual. 
  We show that both stock externalities and the flow have a significant effect on the 
migrant’s location decision, though the “cultural goods” stock effect disappears once we control 
for location fixed effects. Moreover, the significance and size of the effects vary according to the 
legal status of the migrant and whether the migrant is a “new” or a “repeat” migrant. The 
estimated stock effects show an inverse U-shaped pattern, not a linear positive effect as often 
presented in the literature. The results indicate that village-specific links are relatively more 
important for the location decision of a migrant than the availability of ethnic goods. 
Furthermore, legal and skilled migrants appear to be less dependent on the migration stock than 
illegal and unskilled migrants. Flow effects have significant positive effects on the location 
decision of a migrant. Our estimations indicate, however, that there are no significant differences 
in these flows between different types of migrants.   
  Although a number of studies have underscored the importance of networks for location 
choices, the argument that immigrant clustering could be explained by herd behavior has been 
recently introduced to the migration literature (Epstein, 2002). Networks and herds reflect 
different types of information. Migrants might be motivated to choose a location to benefit from 
the network externalities it has to offer. However, because of herd effects, the migrant may 
choose a location on the supposition that recent migrants had information that he does not have. 
Migrants may choose to follow the flow and migrate to the location recent migrants have been 
observed to choose. Our empirical results indicate that network externalities and herd effects can 
   17both be present and influence emigration location decisions.  The network externalities and 
herds’ story is one of many interpretations.   The fact is that both stocks and flows affect the 
decision of the migrant of where to go; this is the most important message of this paper.
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Descriptive Statistics, Means of US Recipient Locations 
 
    First Migration  Last Migration 








Total Population (in 100,000)




















Unskilled Legal   (Observations)  3784  22908 
 (Individuals)  88  498 
Unskilled Illegal   (Observations)  46268  30360 
 (Individuals)  1076  660 
Skilled Legal   (Observations)  5289  11040 
 (Individuals)  123  240 
Skilled Illegal   (Observations)  19436  7498 
 (Individuals)  452  163 
Total (Observations)  74777  71806 
 (Individuals)  1739  1561 
Number of Mexican Villages    47  47 
Number of US locations    43  46 




   20Table 2: 
Conditional Logit Analysis of Mexican Migrant’s Location Choices: 
First Migration 
 
   Constrained Unconstrained  Constrained Unconstrained 
   
                     
                   
  Unskilled  Skilled  Unskilled    Skilled
  Variables Illegal Legal Illegal Legal    Illegal Legal Illegal Legal
Unemployment  Rate -0.033** 0.0004 0.091 -0.169** 0.001 -0.032 0.003 0.094 -0.157** -0.016
                     
                 
                     
                   
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
 
                     
                     
                     
   
(0.015) (0.012) (0.066) (0.036) (0.061) (0.023) (0.026) (0.070) (0.039) -0,066
CPI 0.002 0.010 0.021 0.024 -0.154** 0.029 0.043* 0.047 0.036 -0.129**
(0.016) (0.022) (0.068) (0.032) (0.055) (0.018) (0.024) (0.067) (0.031) (0.056)
Total  Population 0.012** 0.009** 0.021** 0.019** 0.013**  0.048** 0.041** 0.053** 0.046** 0.043**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Distance in Miles (in 1,000)  0.044  0.044  0.196  0.362*  0.701*  -3.571**  -3.645** -3.142** -3.685** -2.554**
(0.085) (0.103) (0.416) (0.187) (0.381) (0.623) (0.628) (0.772) (0.650) (0.749)
Share of Mexican Population (in %)  0.154**  0.125**  0.209**  0.283**  0.266**  -0.071  -0.082*  -0.063  -0.056  -0.025 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.083) (0.057) (0.093) (0.048) (0.049) (0.089) (0.067) (0.091)
Share of Mexican Population (in %)Squared  -0.008**  -0.006** -0.011** -0.017** -0.014** 0.001  0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.0001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Village Migration Experience (in %)  0.110**  0.113**  0.123**  0.100**  0.137**  0.092**  0.093**  0.098**  0.088**  0.120** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.025) (0.009) (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.025) (0.009) (0.183)
Village Migration Experience (in %)Squared/ 100 -0.087**  -0.093** -0.127** -0.071** -0.127** -0.067** -0.070** -0.099** -0.058** -0.108**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.038) (0.011) (0.028) (0.006) (0.008) (0.038) (0.011) (0.025)
Flow 0.233** 0.227** 0.154* 0.292** 0.234** 0.212** 0.201** 0.193** 0.251** 0.222**
(0.025) (0.031) (0.089) (0.056) (0.117) (0.025) (0.023) (0.094) (0.053) (0.112)
US Location Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
           
 
              
 
     
Log-Likelihood -4025.0 -3975,40  -3743.70 -3706,70
Pseudo-R
2          0.385 0,392 0.428 0,4333
 
Note: Observations: 74,777. Standard errors in parenthesis. *: Statistically significant at least at 10% level. **: Statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
   21Table 3: 
Conditional Logit Analysis of Mexican Migrant’s Location Choices: 
Last Migration 
 
   Constrained Unconstrained  Constrained Unconstrained 
   
                     
  Unskilled  Skilled  Unskilled    Skilled
  Variables Illegal Legal Illegal Legal    Illegal Legal Illegal Legal
Unemployment Rate  -0.031**  -0.001  -0.004  -0.200** -0.092** -0.055**  0.018  -0,045  -0.227** -0.155**
                     
           
                     
               
                     
     
                     
                     
                     
                     
 
                     
                 
                     
       
(0.015) (0.021) (0.027) (0.064) (0.045) (0.027) (0.032) (0.038) (0.071) (0.055)
CPI -0.038** 0.002  -0.071** -0.063** -0.035 -0.005 0.034 -0.041 -0.031  -0.072**
(0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.039) (0.032) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023) (0.042) (0.036)
Total  Population 0.00003 0.004* -0.010** 0.023** 0.009**  0.033** 0.048** 0.030** 0.061** 0.047**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Distance in Miles (in 1,000)  0.471**  0.213  0.746**  -0.068 0.755** -2.547** -3.116** -2.363** -2.927** -2.088**
(0.101) (0.140) (0.206) (0.341) (0.296) (0.725) (0.737) (0.762) (0.811) (0.802)
Share of Mexican Population (in %)  0.201**  0.119**  0.268**  0.312**  0.382**  0.012  -0.075  0.013  0.043  0.103 
(0.022) 0.029 (0.044) (0.096) (0.076) (0.057) (0.063) (0.067) (0.114) (0.094)
Share of Mexican Population (in %)Squared  -0.008**  -0.005** -0.011** -0.017** -0.019** 0,0004  0.003*  -0.0001  -0.003  -0.004 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
Village Migration Experience (in %)  0.149**  0.129**  0.208**  0.096**  0.133**  0.135**  0.112**  0.197**  0.088**  0.124** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Village Migration Experience (in %)Squared/ 102 -0.133**  -0.110** -0.209** -0.070** -0.116** -0.117** -0.091** -0.197** -0.062** -0.104**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)
Flow  0.374** 0.357** 0.376** 0.451** 0.429**  0.383** 0.356** 0.438** 0.391** 0.414**
(0.046) (0.064) (0.091) (0.140) (0.145) (0.046) (0.063) (0.091) (0.131) (0.134)
US Location Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
           
 
                    
Log-Likelihood -3446.05 -3370,000 -3242.7 -3170,5
Pseudo-R
2          0,423 0,436 0,457 0,47
 
Note: Observations: 74,777. Standard errors in parenthesis. *: Statistically significant at least at 10% level. **: Statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
   22Appendix A: Data description 
 
Data Basics: 
The Mexican Migration Project is an ongoing collaborative research project that was originally 
based at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Guadalajara. The American base is 
now at the Office of Population Research, Princeton University. The data are available to users at 
http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/databases/dataoverview-en.aspx. The Project combines techniques 
of ethnographic fieldwork and representative survey sampling in its data collection. Interviews 
are generally conducted in December-January when sojourner US migrants often return to 
Mexico, supplemented with surveys of out-migrants located in the United States. 
  Each year since 1987, two to five additional communities in these states are surveyed, 
selected based on their diversity in size, ethnic composition and economic development, not 
because they were known to contain return migrants. Each community is surveyed only once. 
200 households in each community are interviewed, though in smaller communities fewer 
households are chosen. We use the MMP52 version of the data, as some of the complementary 
data we use is not available to us for the MMP71 or the MMP93. In particular, we cannot 
recreate Mexican share of the US population for later years as the MMP is unable to make the 
necessary coding available for translating outside data into geographical areas consistent with the 
MMP geographical areas. Massey et. al. (1987), Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994), and 
Massey and Zenteno (1999) provide details and some data analysis. Massey and Zenteno (1999) 
show that the data are a source of reasonably representative retrospective data on documented 
and undocumented migration to the United States.  
  There are a few serious problems with the data. The interviews were free ranging, with 
the questioners following a semi-structured format. While the questioners tried to cover core 
questions, this process left many missing observations. Moreover, while the sample may be 
representative in a particular survey year, it will not be representative across time since it is 
retrospective and people are surveyed only once. To be included a migrant must have a link to a 
household in Mexico. It is impossible to know how important the "missing" information is for 
the analysis, but it may potentially severely bias the results. Also, as the data has been collected 
over a twenty year period there are issues with deflating wages, relative price changes, and the 
like.  
  We know if individuals ever migrated to the US, whether they were legal or not, how 
many times they worked in the US, the aggregate time spent in the US, when they made their 
first trip and when they made their last trip, how long was each of these trips, whether they were 
currently working in the US, their wages and occupations in the US, as well as information on 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the household members such as age, education and marital 
status. The MMP also contains more detailed migration information on household heads that 
have migrated.  
  In constructing our village migration experience and flow variables we make use of the 
migration event history file of the data. This file provides detailed information on each migratory 
experience of all heads of household, including detailed information on the first and last trip to 
the US such as year and duration of the trip, the documentation used, the state and city of 
residence, performed occupation, and hourly wage, as well as some basic information on each 
border crossing. See Donato, Durand and Massey (1992) for a more detailed description of the 
event-history file. 
 
   23Mexican Share of Population: This variable has been obtained from the US Census Bureau for 
the censual years 1970, 1980 and 1990. A second-degree polynomial equation was estimated to 
these three data points to estimate the size of the Mexican foreign-population in each area during 
the inter-censual years. To estimate the Mexican foreign-born population in the years 1991-1995, 
it has been assumed that the annual growth rate during this period is the same as the annualized 
constant growth rate in each area between 1980 and 1990. The size of the Mexican foreign-born 
population is then divided by the Total Population in a US location. Source: We thank Julie A. 
Phillips for making this variable available to us.  
 
Village Migration Experience and Flow: 
These variables were calculated as indicated in the text from the event history file. Source: 
Source: MMP 52. 
 
Unemployment Rate: The most recent information on the number unemployed and the size of the 
civilian labor force at the county level was obtained for the years 1974 and 1976-1996 from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics Division. For the early 1970s, 
no information by county is available although information on unemployment for the censual 
years 1960 and 1970 is available. For the years 1971-1973, the assumption was made that 
unemployment rates in a county follow the same trends as that of the state. An estimate of the 
unemployment rate for 1975 was obtained by averaging the unemployment rates for 1974 and 
1976. Source: MMP 52. 
 
Total Population: Data were obtained from Census publications, e.g., the CPS and County and 
City Yearbook, for the following years: 1970, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1990, 
and 1991. The population for the intercensual years was estimated by assuming an exponential 
growth function. To estimate the population between 1992-1995, the constant growth rate that 
prevailed between 1980 and 1991 was applied. Source: MMP 52. 
 
Migration Costs: We collected data on three measures of migration costs. For Miles and Hours 
we entered in the main town in the Mexican state in which the origin village is located and the 
main town in the US location into Mapquest (www.mapquest.com). For Actual Costs the data 
come from the MMP 52. Since the actual cost data was very sketchy, we decided not to use it. 
Trials with the Hours and the Actual Costs data yielded similar results to those when we used 
Miles. 
 
Skilled vs. Unskilled, Legal vs. Illegal: 
All migrants with less than 7 years of schooling are considered to be unskilled; those with more 
than 6 years of schooling are considered to be skilled. Undocumented migrants are labeled 
illegal, documented migrants legal. Source: Mexican Migration Project 52. 
 
US Communities: Imperial Valley, CA; Lower San Joaquin, CA; Middle San Joaquin, CA; 
Upper San Joaquin, CA; Salinas-Monterey-Santa Cruz, CA; Sacramento Valley, CA; Ventura-
Oxnard-Simi, CA; Santa Barbara, CA; Napa-Sonoma, CA; Los Angeles County, CA; Orange 
County, CA; San Francisco Urban Area, CA; San Jose Urban Area, CA; Riverside-San 
Bernardino, CA; San Diego County, CA; Rio Vista, CA; Abilene, TX; Austin, TX; Beaumont-
Port Arthur, TX; Brownsville, TX; Bryan-College, TX; Corpus Christi, TX; Dallas-Ft.Worth, 
   24TX; El Paso, TX; Galveston, TX; Houston, TX; Laredo, TX; McAllen, TX; Odessa-Midland, 
TX; San Antonio, TX; Victoria, TX; Chicago, IL; Las Cruces, NM; Tucson, AZ; Phoenix, AZ; 
Denver-Boulder, CO; Reno, NV; Las Vegas, NV; Omaha, NE; New York City, NY; Washington 
D.C., WA; Miami, FL; Atlanta, GA. 
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Imperial Valley, CA  9.767  8.407  1828.160  8.137  1.703 
 (2.491)  (2.603)  (160.834)  (1.533)  (5.863) 
Lower San Joaquin, CA  9.573  4.278  1828.160  6.201  0.532 
 (2.267)  (0.812)  (160.834)  (1.059)  (1.421) 
Middle San Joaquin, CA  10.217  5.328  1828.160  7.957  2.496 
 (2.192)  (0.857)  (160.834)  (1.773)  (3.548) 
Upper San Joaquin, CA  11.752 7.940  1828.160  5.687  3.731 
 (2.183)  (1.558)  (160.834)  (1.148)  (8.151) 
Salinas-Monterey-Santa Cruz, CA  7.538  10.260  1996.099  7.474  2.934 
 (2.031)  (1.676)  (160.467)  (0.513)  (4.492) 
Sacramento Valley, CA  7.632  16.661  1996.099  3.134  2.377 
 (2.162)  (3.029)  (160.467)  (0.534)  (3.661) 
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi, CA  7.213  5.356  1608.970  7.465  1.875 
 (1.314)  (0.957)  (160.619)  (0.858)  (3.747) 
Santa Barbara, CA  6.056  3.121  1608.970  5.937  1.320 
 (0.944)  (0.352)  (160.619)  (2.144)  (2.899) 
Napa-Sonoma, CA  6.392  4.005  1996.099  2.256  0.893 
 (1.899)  (0.676)  (160.467)  (1.050)  (2.686) 
Los Angeles County, CA  6.866  77.237  1608.970  10.041  29.241 
 (1.283)  (7.279)  (160.619)  (2.079)  (24.917) 
Orange County, CA  4.856  19.621  1608.970  5.638  4.932 
 (1.127)  (2.995)  (160.619)  (2.391)  (9.727) 
San Francisco Urban Area, CA  5.586  33.490  1996.099  2.099  1.206 
 (1.710)  (2.163)  (160.467)  (0.465)  (3.185) 
San Jose Urban Area, CA  5.646  13.021  1996.099  3.713  2.595 
 (0.966)  (1.345)  (160.467)  (0.921)  (6.343) 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA  7.241  17.184  1608.970  4.952  0.856 
 (2.315)  (5.212)  (160.619)  (1.701)  (1.689) 
San Diego County, CA  6.533  19.309  1608.970  5.490  5.184 
 (1.488)  (3.758)  (160.619)  (1.374)  (12.782) 
Rio Vista, CA  7.515  2.478  1996.099  1.737  0.067 
 (1.397)  (0.594)  (160.467)  (0.245)  (0.314) 
Abilene, TX  4.694  1.125  940.678  1.351  0.181 
 (1.995)  (0.089)  (149.496)  (0.458)  (0.882) 
Austin, TX  4.307  6.984  940.678  1.674  0.209 
 (1.418)  (1.505)  (149.496)  (0.575)  (0.989) 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX  8.069  3.671  940.678  0.561  0.091 
 (3.559)  (0.136)  (149.496)  (0.102)  (0.581) 
Brownsville, TX  11.093  2.125 621.961  21.255  1.313 
 (2.788)  (0.440)  (134.766)  (5.922)  (2.760) 
Bryan-College, TX  3.807  0.957  940.678  1.421  0.026 
 (1.155)  (0.236)  (149.496)  (0.482)  (0.141) 
Corpus Christi, TX  7.032  3.290  621.961  4.124  0.380 
 (2.548)  (0.288)  (134.766)  (2.181)  (1.852) 
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Dallas-Ft.Worth, TX  4.366  31.542  940.678  2.216  2.705 
 (1.370)  (5.828)  (149.496)  (1.028)  (6.872) 
El Paso, TX  9.263  4.906  1036.457  20.713  0.074 
 (2.087)  (0.794)  (154.082)  (3.998)  (0.224) 
Galveston, TX  6.904  1.997  940.678  1.835  0.128 
 (3.031)  (0.165)  (149.496)  (0.668)  (1.079) 
Houston, TX  5.317  30.412  940.678  3.791  3.782 
 (2.430)  (5.510)  (149.496)  (0.969)  (8.975) 
Laredo, TX  16.013  1.448  621.961  24.189  0.037 
 (4.430)  (0.330)  (134.766)  (6.569)  (0.234) 
McAllen, TX  14.252  2.946  621.961  22.815  1.030 
 (4.765)  (0.743)  (134.766)  (6.316)  (2.370) 
Odessa-Midland, TX  5.230  2.052  1036.457  3.399  0.125 
 (2.748)  (0.340)  (154.082)  (0.319)  (0.669) 
San Antonio, TX  5.668  11.520  940.678  6.203  1.369 
 (1.621)  (1.486)  (149.496)  (2.580)  (3.491) 
Victoria, TX  5.259  1.722  940.678  1.458  0.300 
 (1.577)  (0.148)  (149.496)  (0.623)  (1.123) 
Chicago, IL  6.398  73.705  2033.580  2.461  9.197 
 (1.896)  (1.345)  (149.848)  (0.766)  (17.617) 
Las Cruces, NM  7.715  1.029  1298.042  11.449  0.080 
 (1.030)  (0.237)  (152.066)  (2.955)  (0.315) 
Tucson, AZ  5.462  5.320  1238.160  4.378  0.153 
 (1.437)  (1.003)  (160.834)  (1.437)  (0.816) 
Phoenix, AZ  5.401  15.676  1238.160  2.592  0.762 
 (1.368)  (3.832)  (160.834)  (0.836)  (2.612) 
Denver-Boulder, CO  5.240  7.615  1605.164  1.328  0.240 
 (1.468)  (2.462)  (144.481)  (0.438)  (0.616) 
Reno, NV  5.629  1.923  1524.070  1.550  0.263 
 (1.230)  (0.444)  (160.925)  (1.557)  (1.770) 
Las Vegas, NV  6.909  5.533  1524.070  1.421  0.365 
 (1.672)  (1.822)  (160.925)  (0.606)  (1.173) 
Omaha, NE  4.398  1.766  1687.938  6.046  0.095 
 (1.133)  (1.787)  (149.981)  (7.250)  (0.347) 
New York City, NY  7.246  73.383  2596.999  0.205  0.375 
 (2.371)  (2.263)  (129.604)  (0.188)  (1.413) 
Washington D.C., WA  7.344  6.581  2386.269  0.085  0.059 
 (1.922)  (0.489)  (132.258)  (0.033)  (0.296) 
Miami, FL  6.954  16.210  1926.681  0.324  0.066 
 (1.849)  (2.128)  (132.039)  (0.121)  (0.293) 
Atlanta, GA  5.073  10.963  1749.061  0.208  0.042 
 (1.586)  (0.681)  (132.803)  (0.282)  (0.315) 
Total 7.103  13.351  1459.956  5.511  1.986 
 (3.309)  (18.867)  (527.774)  (6.476)  (7.622) 
Observations per US county: 1739; Total observations: 74777. 
 

















Imperial Valley, CA  10.019  10.887  1805.511  9.201  1.463 
 (2.265)  (3.172)  (128.499)  (1.665)  (5.367) 
Lower San Joaquin, CA  10.889  4.991  1805.511  7.142  0.625 
 (2.350)  (0.870)  (128.499)  (1.391)  (1.179) 
Middle San Joaquin, CA  11.381  6.092  1805.511  9.139  2.618 
 (2.165)  (0.940)  (128.499)  (2.066)  (3.107) 
Upper San Joaquin, CA  12.188 9.324  1805.511  6.776  4.410 
 (2.032)  (1.689)  (128.499)  (1.479)  (10.385) 
Salinas-Monterrey-Santa Cruz, CA 7.774 11.598  1973.522  7.932  2.798 
 (1.684)  (1.591)  (128.294)  (0.689)  (4.014) 
Sacramento Valley, CA  7.802  19.363  1973.522  3.429  2.095 
 (1.773)  (3.299)  (128.294)  (0.575)  (2.715) 
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi, CA  6.951  6.126  1586.325  8.177  2.670 
 (1.375)  (0.914)  (128.400)  (1.111)  (5.449) 
Santa Barbara, CA  5.831  3.436  1586.325  7.992  1.890 
 (1.094)  (0.386)  (128.400)  (2.866)  (3.975) 
Napa-Sonoma, CA  5.901  4.563  1973.522  3.264  1.463 
 (1.557)  (0.668)  (128.294)  (1.340)  (4.713) 
Los Angeles County, CA  6.949  83.756  1586.325  11.916  30.545 
 (1.596)  (7.899)  (128.400)  (2.315)  (24.412) 
Orange County, CA  4.602  22.118  1586.325  7.887  4.562 
 (1.251)  (2.998)  (128.400)  (2.882)  (8.758) 
San Francisco Urban Area, CA  5.233  35.446  1973.522  2.539  1.175 
 (1.348)  (2.393)  (128.294)  (0.623)  (2.580) 
San Jose Urban Area, CA  5.300  14.100  1973.522  4.421  2.213 
 (1.077)  (1.289)  (128.294)  (1.173)  (6.033) 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA  7.476  22.107  1586.325  6.448  0.920 
 (2.032)  (6.221)  (128.400)  (2.143)  (1.453) 
San Diego County, CA  5.977  22.546  1586.325  6.794  5.801 
 (1.454)  (3.890)  (128.400)  (1.690)  (15.218) 
Rio Vista, CA  7.018  3.014  1973.522  1.930  0.087 
 (1.393)  (0.657)  (128.294)  (0.299)  (0.328) 
Abilene, TX  5.543  1.174  918.260  1.731  0.252 
 (1.642)  (0.068)  (133.864)  (0.635)  (1.200) 
Amarillo, TX  4.847  1.847 1157.821  1.616  0.107 
 (1.194)  (0.146)  (134.139)  (0.886)  (0.521) 
Austin, TX  4.752  8.237  918.260  2.098  0.177 
 (1.248)  (1.510)  (133.864)  (0.721)  (1.066) 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX  9.060  3.682  918.260  0.588  0.097 
 (2.799)  (0.100)  (133.864)  (0.093)  (0.601) 
Brownsville, TX  12.328  2.451 604.505  20.797  0.794 
 (2.155)  (0.390)  (126.000)  (4.099)  (1.978) 
Bryan-College, TX  4.071  1.121  918.260  1.817  0.020 
 (1.094)  (0.201)  (133.864)  (0.650)  (0.082) 
Corpus Christi, TX  8.169  3.465  604.505  3.613  0.223 
 (2.152)  (0.229)  (126.000)  (1.414)  (1.188) 
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Dallas-Ft.Worth, TX  5.114  36.443  918.260  3.214  3.142 
 (1.164)  (5.902)  (133.864)  (1.324)  (8.955) 
El Paso, TX  10.156  5.551  1012.657  20.871  0.059 
 (1.460)  (0.772)  (133.075)  (2.936)  (0.153) 
Galveston, TX  7.803  2.117  918.260  1.705  0.160 
 (2.234)  (0.150)  (133.864)  (0.430)  (1.345) 
Houston, TX  6.120  34.397  918.260  4.741  3.309 
 (1.939)  (4.840)  (133.864)  (1.258)  (8.157) 
Laredo, TX  16.912  1.721  604.505  24.742  0.024 
 (3.217)  (0.331)  (126.000)  (4.995)  (0.138) 
McAllen, TX  17.086  3.533  604.505  22.232  0.579 
 (3.884)  (0.701)  (126.000)  (4.306)  (1.445) 
Odessa-Midland, TX  6.289  2.229  1012.657  3.531  0.048 
 (2.363)  (0.259)  (133.075)  (0.360)  (0.332) 
San Angelo, TX  5.015  1.395  1012.657  4.359  0.111 
 (1.137)  (0.105)  (133.075)  (0.760)  (0.472) 
San Antonio, TX  6.147  12.716  918.260  5.716  0.815 
 (1.364)  (1.427)  (133.864)  (1.677)  (2.190) 
Victoria, TX  5.897  1.831  918.260  2.055  0.252 
 (1.338)  (0.131)  (133.864)  (0.875)  (1.174) 
Chicago, IL  6.521  74.754  2011.131  3.163  8.350 
 (1.456)  (1.295)  (134.142)  (0.873)  (16.917) 
Tucson, AZ  5.030  6.102  1215.511  4.733  0.111 
 (1.246)  (0.934)  (128.499)  (1.250)  (0.551) 
Phoenix, AZ  5.084  18.915  1215.511  3.198  0.402 
 (1.110)  (3.869)  (128.499)  (1.038)  (1.352) 
Denver-Boulder, CO  5.456  8.437  1583.517  1.680  0.211 
 (1.098)  (3.109)  (127.860)  (0.695)  (0.422) 
Pueblo, CO  8.673  1.244  1583.517  0.857  0.158 
 (2.370)  (0.017)  (127.860)  (0.410)  (1.058) 
Reno, NV  5.403  2.289  1501.444  3.058  0.368 
 (1.006)  (0.438)  (128.591)  (2.160)  (2.306) 
Las Vegas, NV  6.426  7.201  1501.444  1.976  0.251 
 (1.501)  (2.100)  (128.591)  (0.718)  (0.934) 
St. Louis, MO  5.614  14.196  1549.915  0.069  0.063 
 (1.324)  (0.434)  (134.021)  (0.017)  (0.210) 
Omaha, NE  3.992  1.551  1665.505  5.543  0.157 
 (1.168)  (1.679)  (134.353)  (6.134)  (0.460) 
New York City, NY  7.469  73.164  2578.455  0.390  0.265 
 (2.047)  (1.464)  (120.590)  (0.266)  (1.148) 
Washington D.C., WA  7.281  6.264  2367.655  0.114  0.053 
 (1.733)  (0.393)  (123.929)  (0.034)  (0.256) 
Miami, FL  7.307  17.999  1908.071  0.436  0.056 
 (1.630)  (2.156)  (123.611)  (0.142)  (0.194) 
Atlanta, GA  5.388  11.564  1730.293  0.484  0.068 
 (1.075)  (0.725)  (124.443)  (0.460)  0.404) 
Total 7.310  14.066  1431.984  5.568  1.870 
 (3.413)  (19.216)  (510.941)  (6.163)  (7.563) 
Observations per US county: 1561; Total observations: 71806. 
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